


Haagsche Aardwarmte Leyweg (HAL) Seismic Hazard Analysis

Date: January 2020


Prepared by: [REDACTED] & [REDACTED]

Reviewed by: [REDACTED]



Summary

1. Geological setting warranted a **(level-2)** Seismic Hazard Analysis
2. Mohr Coulomb and Finite Element models show the faults in HAL **remain stable**
3. Under Groningen depletion conditions, faults in HAL would **remain stable**
4. There is a **very low** possibility that an unmapped fault reaches a critical state under **worst case** fault and production parameters
5. Extreme scenario would have a maximum possible magnitude in the order of **Mw = 1.6 after 30 years**
 - This is considered very unlikely (<0.1% chance)
 - A TLS is set up to mitigate the potential impact. Possible other mitigation measures are decrease of injection pressure and increase the injection temperature.



Contents

- 1) Geological setting HAL
- 2) SRA methodology
- 3) **Deterministic analysis:**
 - 1) Mohr Coulomb
 - 2) Finite Element
- 4) **Probabilistic analysis:**
 - 1) Mohr Coulomb
 - 2) Finite Element: Extreme scenario
- 5) **Mitigation measures**




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- 1) Geological setting HAL
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
Geological Setting HAL

Base Vlieland depth map

Worst case: 50m offset




Continuation in depth



Connectivity HAL

- HAG-GT-02i well test: 1400 mD
- HAG-GT-01p well test: 2300 mD
- Interference test: Minimum of 280 mD
- Less high permeability of interference test is most likely caused by a lower fault permeability and/or offset along the fault reducing connectivity



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SHA for geothermal systems

- SHA based on QCON/IF, *Defining the Framework for Seismic Hazard Assessment in Geothermal Projects*, October 2016
- Result of SHA Level 1 QuickScan: low seismic risk (**score = 0.26**)
- Due to
 - Offset in the reservoir
 - Proximity to faults and fault zone
 - Planned production through a fault
 → a SHA Level 2 will be executed.





Figure 5-1. Level 1 SHA assessment for HAL based on the IF/QCON guidelines.

SHA Level 1: QuickScan HAL

Table 2-1 SHA scoring scheme for TWL-2. The applicable scores are highlighted in red. From the individual scores a normalised QS score of 0.26 is calculated.

Score	Basement connected	Inter-well pressure communication	Re-injection pressure [MPa]	Flow rate [m ³ /h]	Epicentral distance to natural earth quakes [km]	Epicentral distance to induced seismicity [km]	Distance to fault [km]	Orientation of fault in current stress field	Net injected volume [1000 m ³]
10	Yes	No	>7	>360	<1	<1	<0.1	Favourable	>20
7	Possible	Unlikely	4-7	180-360	1-5	1-5	0.1-0.5	Shearing possible	5-20
3	Unlikely	Likely	1-4	50-180	5-10	5-10	0.5-1.5	Shearing unlikely	0.1-5
0	No	Yes	<1	<50	>10	>10	>1.5	locked	<0.1





Figure 5-2. Result of the SHA QS-Scoring table as put forward by IF/QCON.

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Mohr Coulomb Stress Field: HAL

- Density logs show a vertical stress gradient for HAL of $\sigma_1 = 0.214 \text{ bar/m}$
- Leak Off Tests and Formation Integrity tests show the minimum horizontal stress gradient at $\sigma_3 = 0.165 \text{ bar/m}$
- Groningen relations between σ_3 and σ_2 show a maximum horizontal stress of $\sigma_2 = 0.184 \text{ bar/m}$
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- The EBN Geo-drilling events database (GDE) was advised but contained no better constraints on the stress situation near HAL
- *For details see Appendix 1*



Mohr Coulomb model: HAL


- Situation after injection is closer to the failure line

Under these already conservative parameters no failure is expected

Injection Temperature: **45°C**

ΔP at injector: 5 bar (**150m³/hr** injection rate)



3-D Mohr-Coulomb failure diagram HAL




- Young's Modulus $E = 10$ GPa
- Poisson's ratio $\nu = 0.3$
- Thermal expansion coefficient $\alpha = 1 \cdot 10^{-5}$
- Friction coefficient $\mu = 0.6$
- $T_{\text{reservoir}} = 73^\circ\text{C}$
- Re-injection temperature = 45°C (Winter scenario)
- No cohesion assumed**

Production parameters: worst case (winter)
Fault parameters: worst case
Reservoir parameters: conservative

For interpretation see Appendix 2



- If $\sigma_1 > \sigma_2 > \sigma_3$, and σ_2 is **parallel** to the fault azimuth, the fault is more 'open' and more prone to failure (top-left figure)
- A fault with an azimuth perpendicular to σ_2 , or **parallel** to σ_3 , is in the most stable orientation (top-right figure)
- **F1** and **F2** are orientated at an angle of 40° and 60° and therefore more stable than fault parallel to σ_2 . This is reflected in a position less prone to failure in the Mohr-Coulomb analysis – away from the 'large' circle (next slide)



Mohr Coulomb analysis: impact of fault azimuth


- Fault situation in HAL is more stable than a situation where faults are parallel to the maximum horizontal stress σ_2
- This is already for a conservative production scenario

Production parameters: worst case (winter)
Fault parameters: expected
Reservoir parameters: conservative

Injection Temperature: 45°C

ΔP at injector: 5 bar (150m³/hr injection rate)

3-D Mohr-Coulomb failure diagram HAL



○ Fault azimuth perpendicular on σ_3

○ Fault azimuth perpendicular on σ_2

● F1 HAL

● F2 HAL

Mohr Coulomb analysis


- Fault situation in HAL is more stable than a situation where faults are parallel to the maximum horizontal stress σ_2
- This is already for a conservative production scenario

Production parameters: worst case (winter)
Fault parameters: expected
Reservoir parameters: conservative

Injection Temperature: 45°C

ΔP at injector: 5 bar (150m³/hr injection rate)

3-D Mohr-Coulomb failure diagram HAL




Production will **not** bring the situation to a critical state for any given fault orientation or dip
 The mapped faults are even less prone to failure

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Finite Element Analysis(1)


- Mohr-Coulomb only looks at one point in the subsurface
- Does not take into account:
 - Geometrical effects
 - Effects of local stress concentrations
 - Effect of stress arching
 - Etc.
- In order to capture the above, build 2D finite element model and simulate lifecycle for one doublet
 - Fully coupled: fluid flow – thermal convection / diffusion- stress calculations – failure & slip calculations
- In building FE model, follow a similar approach as published for Groningen depletion (*Buijze, v.d. Bogert et al*)




Finite Element Analysis(2)

- 'Calibration' against Groningen:
 - Build same Groningen FE model as Buijze et al
 - Use this to compute fault slip as a function of depletion
 - Estimate maximum seismic magnitude based on the above
 - Build & run similar FE model for HAL case, & compute fault slip
 - Analyze & explain differences Groningen ↔ HAL


HAL




Groningen



Finite Element: Groningen case calibration



Groningen Depletion







"Fault reactivation mechanisms and dynamic rupture modelling of depletion-induced seismic events in a Rotliegend gas reservoir"

- Buijze et al., 2017

Groningen Depletion

DEPLETION: 155 BAR (± 1987)

Distance to coulomb failure.
A value of **1** is coulomb failure.
Below this we have elastic behaviour






1/10th millimeter


1987

Groningen Depletion

DEPLETION: 180 BAR ($\pm$ 1995)




~3 Centimeter




Groningen Depletion

DEPLETION: 270 BAR ($\pm$ 2016)


Pore Pressure (bar)



Coulomb failure (0 to 1)




Displacement along fault




~9 Centimeter

Groningen Earthquakes




2016


Groningen Depletion




Groningen model matches expected results in terms of timing, depletion and magnitude



Groningen Depletion: Mohr Coulomb




Finite Element: HAL Model



HAL Finite Element Model


- The two mapped faults were implemented in the model
 - 70° dipping fault below the reservoir
 - 50° dipping fault in the reservoir
- 50m offset was used as a most conservative scenario
- Reservoir is 100m thick, shale on top is 50m




HAL Finite Element Model

Production parameters: expected
Fault parameters: worst case
Reservoir parameters: conservative

- As base case a conservative scenario was used
 - Most critical fault azimuth (e.g. $\sigma_1 - \sigma_3$ Mohr Circle)
 - 50m offset along fault (expected: 25m)
 - Young's Modulus at 10 GPa (expected: 3 GPa)
 - Poisson's ratio at 0.3 (expected: 0.25)
 - Flow through the fault
- 5 Models for HAL under these conservative conditions
 - Hypothetical depletion
 - Business Case Scenario
 - Maximum Business Case Scenario
 - Impermeable fault scenario
 - High-skin scenario






Finite Element: Hypothetical depletion case HAL



Hypothetical depletion HAL: 180 bar


Groningen case: **failure**

HAL case: **far from failure**



Distance to coulomb failure.
A value of **1** is coulomb failure.


Depletion in HAL vs Groningen: Mohr Coulomb





Finite Element scenarios HAL

	Business Case	Maximum Business Case	Impermeable Fault	Skin model
Flowrate	165/100 m ³ /hr Variable	165 m ³ /hr All year	Unrealistic	165 m ³ /hr All year
Resulting pressure increase	5 bar	25 bar*	25 bar	60 bar
Temperature	45°/57°/63° Variable	45° All year	45° All year	45° All year

**For the Maximum Business Case scenario, a conservative permeability in the reservoir is used. This results in a higher injection pressure in the reservoir.*




Business Case Scenario HAL




Business Case Scenario HAL

- Injection pressure is matched to the
- Temperature is variable






Business Case Scenario HAL



Business Case Scenario HAL

Time = 3 years







Distance to Coulomb failure.
A value of 1 is Coulomb failure. The initial condition in HAL starts at **0.45**.
For comparison, the initial condition in Groningen has areas up to **0.76**.







Business Case Scenario HAL

Time = 15 years




Business Case Scenario HAL

Time = 30 years



Business Case Scenario HAL


Time = 30 years



Business Case Scenario HAL

Time = 30 years


Elastic Displacement along fault




This is elastic displacement, not instantaneous slip.

However, slip of in the order of $2/100^{\text{th}}$ of a mm would have a **maximum** magnitude of **0.6**

Maximum magnitude over years







Slip of all points along the fault







Maximum Business Case Scenario

Time = 3 years







Maximum Business Case Scenario

Time = 15 years



Maximum Business Case Scenario

Time = 30 years



Maximum Business Case Scenario


- Situation after injection is closer to the failure line

Under the maximum possible business case, no failure is expected

Injection Temperature: **45°C**

ΔP at injector: 5 bar (**150m³/hr** injection rate)


3-D Mohr-Coulomb failure diagram



- Young's Modulus $E = 10$ GPa
- Poisson's ratio $\nu = 0.3$
- Thermal expansion coefficient $\alpha = 1 \cdot 10^{-5}$
- Friction coefficient $\mu = 0.6$
- $T_{\text{reservoir}} = 73^\circ\text{C}$
- Re-injection temperature = 45°C (Winter scenario)
- Injection pressure = 25 bar
- No cohesion assumed**

Production parameters: worst case (winter)
Fault parameters: worst case
Reservoir parameters: conservative



HAL cooling: Mohr Coulomb







Finite element

Impermeable fault scenario

- Impermeable fault may have a large temperature and pressure difference along the fault
- The model was forced to come to this scenario as the temperature front is not expected to reach the fault
- To increase the temperature contrast, no temperature diffusion was allowed through the fault.




Impermeable fault scenario




Impermeable fault scenario

Time = 30 years




0.15 millimeter



Faults **remain stable** if there is a large temperature contrast along the fault



High-skin scenario

- A high skin would increase the injection pressure locally around the well
- A skin up to **60 bar** is tested, reflecting the maximum allowed injection pressure under SodM criteria
- The pressure impact on the fault is found to be negligible



High-skin scenario

High skin (60 bar), high pore pressure around well



Finite Element: Conclusions

- 5 models were shown for HAL
 - Hypothetical depletion
 - Under similar conditions as Groningen, faults in HAL are far from the failure level ($SCU_{max} = 0.60$)
 - Business Case Scenario
 - Normal geothermal operations have little effect on the stability faults ($SCU_{max} = 0.61$)
 - Maximum Business Case Scenario
 - Maximum injection possible in HAL has increased effect, but remains small ($SCU_{max} = 0.71$)
 - Impermeable fault scenario
 - A completely impermeable fault, resulting in a large temperature contrast, is not expected to produce larger instability ($SCU_{max} = 0.71$)
 - High-skin scenario
 - A high skin will result in a high increase of pressure, and decrease of horizontal stress around the well, but is not expected to affect the faults



Contents


- 1) Geological setting HAL
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 - 2) Finite Element
- 4) **Probabilistic analysis:**
 - 1) Mohr Coulomb
 - 2) Finite Element: Extreme scenario
- 5) **Mitigation measures**

Probabilistic analysis: Approach A

- The goal of this exercise is to add the possible range of input parameters, e.g. Youngs Modulus, Thermal expansion coefficient, stress gradients.
- Fault parameters are kept **constant**
- Monte Carlo simulation was done on a large range of parameters (1000 runs)
- Triangular distribution is used to omit outliers & this is consistent with DoubletCalc approach

Production parameters: worst case (winter)
Fault parameters: worst case
Reservoir parameters: variable

	Reservoir Temperature (°C)	Thermoelastic coefficient	Injection Pressure (bar)	Vertical stress gradient (bar/m)	Horizontal stress gradient (bar/m)	Fault dip
Minimum	70	0.5	2	0.207	0.158	35
Most likely	73	1	5	0.213	0.165	50
Maximum	76	2	25	0.225	0.172	65



Input parameters

- Reservoir temperature 73 ± 3 °C from measurement
- Combining of **Young's Modulus**, **Poisson's ratio** and **thermal expansion coefficient** these values into a thermoelastic expansion coefficient

$$K_T = \frac{\alpha E}{1-\nu}$$


- K typically ranges from 0.5 to 2
- Vertical stress gradient determined at 0.207 based on density log, the TNO standard is 0.225. Not expected to be much lower than 0.207
- Horizontal stress gradient determined at 0.165, lowest FIT in the area shows 0.158, maximum set at 0.172
- Fault azimuth was not varied as **worst case** orientation is used (see white dot in slide 22)
- Fault dip is within **most conservative** range

	Reservoir Temperature (°C)	Thermoelastic coefficient	Injection Pressure (bar)	Vertical stress gradient (bar/m)	Horizontal stress gradient (bar/m)	Fault dip
Minimum	70	0.5	2	0.207	0.158	35
Most likely	73	1	5	0.213	0.165	50
Maximum	76	2	25	0.225	0.172	65

Monte carlo: 1000 runs

Production parameters: worst case (winter)
Fault parameters: worst case
Reservoir parameters: variable

- Only looked at for the **most conservative**
Mohr Circle ($\sigma_1 - \sigma_3$) (see slide 23)
- **No cohesion** for fault
- **Most critical fault dips**
- Cooling down to **45°C**
- Effect of the 1% cases further investigated in Finite Element Model




For already a worst case, **<1%** of the Monte Carlo simulations fall above the Mohr coulomb failure line

Probabilistic Analysis: Approach B

Including fault properties

- An alternative probabilistic scenario also includes the **fault properties**
 - Cohesion: Minimum of 0, maximum of 30 bar. This is a realistic expectation of cohesion from literature.
 - Friction coefficient is an unknown factor, varying from 0.4 to 0.7
 - Dip of fault (already included in approach A)

Variable Mohr Coulomb Failure Line





	Fault Properties		
	Cohesion (bar)	Friction coefficient (-)	Dip (degrees)
Minimum	0	0.4	35
Most likely	15	0.55	50
Maximum	30	0.7	65

Production parameters: worst case (winter)
Fault parameters: variable
Reservoir parameters: variable

Probabilistic Analysis: Approach B

Including fault properties

- Maximum SCU value of 1.1
- This would result in only **<1%** of the values falling over the failure line
- Bulk of the SCU values are between 0.5 and 0.8, in the **stable** range




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Extreme scenario:





What is required to make a fault slip

1. The most extreme scenario encountered from the probabilistic analysis (see Appendix 7)
2. Permanent winter conditions, 45°C and 150 m³/hr injection
3. No cohesion, worst fault orientation



Extreme scenario HAL


Time = 0 years




Extreme scenario HAL

Time = 21 years


Temperature




Pore Pressure



Horizontal Effective Stress





Coulomb Failure (0 to 1)



Extreme scenario HAL

Time = 21 years




1/10th millimeter


Extreme scenario HAL

Time = 30 years


Temperature




Pore Pressure



Horizontal Effective Stress





Coulomb Failure (0 to 1)



Extreme scenario HAL


Time = 30 years



Extreme scenario HAL:

Approximate relation to magnitude



Maximum magnitude over years



Note that this is for:

- An unrealistic parameter set (Appendix 7)
- Completely cooled down fault to 45°C
- No cohesion for the fault
- Conservative fault orientation
- A flow path through the fault
- Maximum offset (50m) of reservoir
- Assuming all release accommodated in 1 event
- Large flow contrast between layers

Maximum PGV over years



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Risk matrix


- A qualitative risk matrix was set up according to the IF/QCon guidelines
- Defining the impacts takes into account a trailing effect which may lead to a $\sim 0.5 M_w$ increase
- Three stages of the project are defined
 1. Prior to production, there is no induced seismicity expected
 2. During production, it is very unlikely an *average* impact ($M_w > 1.5$) will happen
 3. Setting up a TLS qualitatively lowers the impact to *minimal*

		Impact				
		Negligible $M_w < 1.0$	Minimal $M_w > 1.0$	Average $M_w < 1.5$	Significant $M_w > 2.5$	Severe $M_w > 3.5$
Possibility of induced seismicity	Very likely					
	Likely					
	Possible					
	Unlikely					
	Very unlikely					




Traffic Light System (TLS)


- To mitigate the possible impact in terms of surface effects a TLS was set up
 - Based on the geomechanical results this is defined in the risk matrix as a **very unlikely** scenario
- The Traffic Light System is to be monitored by 3 seismic monitoring stations
- It is proposed on the basis of localized seismicity to the HAL project
- Threshold values of the TLS are to be verified and/or updated after seismic monitoring stations are installed to accommodate for background readings, sensitivity and technical capability of the stations



Traffic Light System (TLS)



- A PGV value of **1 mm/s** is considered a threshold which is noticeable on the surface. With use of the GMPE relations of Groningen this roughly corresponds to a M_w of 1.3. Both these values are used for the green part of the TLS, which means operations may continue as normal as long as measurements remain under these values.
- Values between 1 and 1.6 mm/s (PGV) and 1.3 and 1.6 (M_w) is considered a yellow part of the TLS. This is possibly noticeable on the surface, but not expected to cause any damage. Action however should be taken (a 50% temporary reduction of production is suggested), and models should be evaluated with production history to propose an adjustment of the plan. The aim should be to get back to the green part of the TLS.
- A PGV value of 1.6 mm/s is here considered a threshold to be noticed on the surface. This roughly corresponds to a M_w of 1.6. This is considered a stop threshold for the operation and needs to be thoroughly investigated, including possible mitigation measures.



Traffic Light System (TLS)

	PGV (mm/s)	M _w	Mitigation
Stop	> 1.6	> 1.6	- Report to regulator - Continue seismic monitoring - Bring production to a halt - Evaluate geomechanical models and history match with observed event(s). Investigate mitigation measures. - Propose new production plan
Evaluate	> 1.0 < 1.6	> 1.3 < 1.6	- Report to regulator - Continue seismic monitoring - Lower injection pressure to 50% temporarily - Evaluate geomechanical models and history match with observed event(s) - Propose new production plan
Continue	< 1.0	< 1.3	- Continue seismic monitoring - Continue production as planned - Update geomechanical models and outcomes with periodic injectivity measurements - Update production plan when necessary


Other possible mitigation measures

1. Increase injection Temperature

- This will 'heat up' a critical fault and is shown to restabilize the fault
- Dependent on production history; propagation of flow is restricted by time


2. Decrease injection rate

- Injection rate is of relatively less impact than temperature effect
- Decrease/stop of injection would give the system time to heat up




Conclusions

1. Mohr Coulomb analysis shows that production will **not** bring the situation to a critical state for **worst case** fault and production parameters and conservative reservoir parameters
2. Calibrated Finite Element Model shows **far from** critical failure for HAL in multiple production scenarios under **worst case** fault and conservative reservoir parameters
3. Under Groningen depletion conditions, faults in HAL would **remain stable**
4. There is a **very low** possibility that an unmapped fault reaches a critical state under **worst case** fault and production parameters
5. Extreme scenario is extrapolated to a possible magnitude in the order of $M_w = 1.6$ after **30 years**.
 - This is considered very unlikely (<0.1% chance)
 - Can be mitigated by decreasing pressure or increasing injection temperature






Appendix 1:

Geology: Structure and connectivity



Geological Setting HAL


Near Base Delft map



3) Structural Interpretation



The injector HAG-GT-02i is drilled in a major (inactive) fault zone, in a compressional bend.

The well is positioned in the transfer zone. This results in a denser fault network around this well.



Near-Base Delft depth map


2) Faults



Connectivity HAL


- HAG-GT-02i well test: 1400 mD
 - Baffle at 770m
- HAG-GT-01p well test: 2300 mD
 - Baffle at 1400m
- Interference test: Minimum of 280 mD, higher permeability models (366 and 686 mD also match the data)
- Baffles were not linked to faults
- Less high permeability of interference test is most likely caused by a lower fault permeability and/or offset along the fault reducing connectivity
- Geologically 2 flow models possible:
The worst case (**Model 1**) is used

Model 1: Flow through the faults with semi-transmissible faults: worst case




Model 2: Flow around the faults with non-transmissible faults

Appendix 2: Stress Field derivation




Stress field (1)

Density (g/cm³)




- Density profile from West-Netherlands basin from density logs of well LIR-45
- Top section from offset density log of S05-01 up to 40m.
- Density log is corrected for wash-outs and top section (See Appendix 3)
- DEL-08 is shown for comparison to HAL area
- The resulting vertical stress gradient for HAL is **0.207 bar/m**



Stress field (2)

- Minimum horizontal stress gradient can be derived from offset Leak Off Tests (Verweij et al., 2012)
- Formation Integrity Test from HAG-GT-01p indicates a potential higher minimum stress gradient
- The resulting minimum horizontal stress gradient is **0.165 bar/m**




Stress field (3)

- The maximum horizontal stress is not determined in the West-Netherlands Basin
- There is a clear orientation of the maximum horizontal stress field trending approximately 135°/315°

- A core-based relation from Groningen is used


$$S_H = 1.32 \cdot S_h - 0.32 \cdot P_p \text{ (Mechelse, 2017)}$$

- This results in a maximum horizontal stress gradient of **0.184 bar/m**



Appendix 3:

Reservoir parameters from logs



Young's modulus & Poisson's ratio


Poisson's ratio (-)

Young's Modulus (GPa)



Sand

Shale


Depth Delft Reservoir offset well (MD)



Depth Delft Reservoir offset well (MD)



Density log correction




	Vertical stress gradient (bar/m)	Corrected vertical stress gradient	Explanation
Minimum	0.21	0.207	Minimum top-section density
Most likely	0.213	0.214	Average top-section density
Maximum	0.225	0.225	Standard value The Netherlands (TNO, multiple occasions)


Average density used for top section

Despike

Small wash-out corrected






Appendix 4: Ground motion prediction





Ground Motion Prediction: extreme scenario HAL


- To create Peak Ground Velocity maps, the GMPE relation by Roos (2009) was used
- The type of surface has a significant effect on the predicted PGV
- The PGV is about 2 times smaller at a 3km (surface) distance from the epicentre





Ground Motion prediction $M_w = 1.0$



Ground Motion Prediction $M_w = 2.0$




Extreme scenario HAL: Magnitude





Appendix 5:

Depletion vs thermo-elastic effect


Theoretical Background



Mohr Coulomb analysis: Depletion (pressure decrease)




Mohr Coulomb analysis: Depletion (pressure decrease + volume decrease)



$$\Delta\sigma_1 = \Delta p$$


$$\Delta\sigma_3 = \Delta p \frac{v}{1-v}$$

Mohr-Coulomb analysis: Cooling



Volume decrease due to cooling:
$$\Delta\sigma'_3 = -\alpha\Delta T \frac{E}{1-\nu}$$

Mohr-Coulomb analysis: Cooling + pressure increase




Volume decrease due to cooling & pressure increase: $\Delta\sigma_3 = -\left(\alpha\Delta T \frac{E}{1-\nu} + \Delta p_f\right)$


Thermo-elastic effect

- Thermal cooling in reservoir and diffusion to surrounding layers
- No stress concentrations at lithology boundaries


Temperature




Pore Pressure




Coulomb Failure (0 to 1)



Coulomb Failure (0 to 1)




HAL depletion and cooling: Poisson's ratio



Appendix 6:


Magnitude calculation:

Theoretical background



Magnitude Calculation


- Magnitude $M_w = \frac{2}{3} 10_{\log(M_0)} - 6.1$
- $M_0 = \int G \cdot \bar{D} \cdot S$
 - G is the shear modulus
 - $\bar{D}$ is the displacement
 - S is the surface of the fault
- The surface is considered to be 100m by maximum 400m.



SCU (Shear Capacity Utilisation)

- Indicates distance to Mohr Coulomb Failure Line

- $$SCU = \frac{\tau}{\tau_{max}} = \frac{\tau}{C + (\sigma_n - P)\mu}$$



Appendix 7: Monte Carlo analysis sensitvitivity

